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Policy Points:
 Our study indicates that there are opportunities for cost savings in
generic drug markets in Europe and the United States.
 Regulators should make it easier for generic drugs to reach the market.
 Regulators and payers should apply measures to stimulate price com-
petition among generic drugmakers and to increase generic drug use.
 To meaningfully evaluate policy options, it is important to analyze his-
torical context and understand why similar initiatives failed previously.
Context: Rising drug prices are putting pressure on health care budgets. Poli-
cymakers are assessing how they can save money through generic drugs.
Methods:We compared generic drug prices and market shares in 13 European
countries, using data from 2013, to assess the amount of variation that exists
between countries. To place these results in context, we reviewed evidence from
recent studies on the prices and use of generics in Europe and the United States.
We also surveyed peer-reviewed studies, gray literature, and books published
since 2000 to (1) outline existing generic drug policies in European countries
and the United States; (2) identify ways to increase generic drug use and to
promote price competition among generic drug companies; and (3) explore
barriers to implementing reform of generic drug policies, using a historical
example from the United States as a case study.
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Findings: The prices and market shares of generics vary widely across Europe.
For example, prices charged by manufacturers in Switzerland are, on average,
more than 2.5 times those inGermany andmore than 6 times those in theUnited
Kingdom, based on the results of a commonly used price index. The proportion
of prescriptions filled with generics ranges from 17% in Switzerland to 83%
in the United Kingdom. By comparison, the United States has historically had
low generic drug prices and high rates of generic drug use (84% in 2013),
but has in recent years experienced sharp price increases for some off-patent
products. There are policy solutions to address issues in Europe and the United
States, such as streamlining the generic drug approval process and requiring
generic prescribing and substitution where such policies are not yet in place.
The history of substitution laws in the United States provides insights into
the economic, political, and cultural issues influencing the adoption of generic
drug policies.
Conclusions: Governments should apply coherent supply- and demand-side
policies in generic drug markets. An immediate priority is to convince more
physicians, pharmacists, and patients that generic drugs are bioequivalent to
branded products. Special-interest groups continue to obstruct reform in Europe
and the United States.
Keywords: generic drugs, health expenditures, pharmaceutical policies,
prices.
R ising drug prices are putting pressure on health carebudgets.1,2 Drugs account for sizable shares of health carespending in rich countries, with costs of new treatments for
diabetes,3 multiple sclerosis,4 rheumatoid arthritis,5 various cancers,6-9
and dermatological conditions10 increasing. There are many reasons, in-
cluding aggressive pricing strategies by manufacturers6 and adoption
of greater numbers of orphan and personalized drugs with high price
tags.11,12 Governments are responding by looking at ways to negotiate
lower prices for patented drugs13 and to expand the use of health technol-
ogy assessments to ensure medicines are given to those who will benefit
most.14 Policymakers are also assessing how they can savemoney through
generics.
Generic drugs are bioequivalent replicas of brand-name drugs, con-
taining the same active ingredients and with identical quality, safety, and
efficacy profiles.15-18 Any differences are limited to inactive ingredients,
like coloring, flavoring, and stabilizing agents. Generics can, in theory,
be sold for a fraction of the price of brand name drugs for 2 reasons.
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First, it is relatively cheap to bring a bioequivalent product to market.
Second, the market for the drug typically already exists, significantly
reducing marketing expenses.19
The cost-saving potential of greater generic drug use makes it an
attractive option for policymakers, especially since many blockbuster
drugs went off patent in the last decade, with more soon to follow.
Notably, the cholesterol-lowering drug rosuvastatin (Crestor)—one of
the best-selling medicines of all time—lost market exclusivity in the
United States and many European countries in 2016.20
We have 4 objectives. First, we compare generic drug prices and
market shares in 13 European countries, using data from 2013, to assess
the amount of variation that exists between countries. To place these
findings in context, we review recent studies on prices and use of generic
drugs in Europe and the United States. Second, we outline existing
generic drug policies in European countries and theUnited States. Third,
given issues identified in the earlier parts, we explore possible measures
to increase usage of generics and to stimulate price competition among
generic drugmakers. And, fourth, we analyze obstacles to improving
generic drug policies, using a historical example from the United States
as a case study.
Methods
Data Set
We selected 13 European countries with different generic drug
policies: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Poland,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Sweden,
and Denmark (listed in order of pharmaceutical market size). For
each country, we obtained IMS Health data on the 2013 sales of 200
off-patent active ingredients (Appendix 1), available in 3,156 strength-
form combinations. These were the most-prescribed off-patent active
ingredients in the European Union (EU) that year, according to IMS
Health data. Sales were recorded in terms of volume and monetary value.
Volumes were measured in number of doses, which IMSHealth some-
times refers to as “standard units.” IMS Health defined the amount in
a single dose of each product, which could be 1 tablet, 5 mL of liquid,
1 vial, and so forth.21 We excluded 129 products (4.1%, 129/3,156) for
which there was no information on dosage.
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Monetary values were measured in euros, with foreign currencies con-
verted to euros at yearly average exchange rates.22 These figures were
obtained by multiplying the price of a product, excluding value-added
taxes, by the number of packs sold over the year. This was done us-
ing ex-manufacturer and retail prices separately. Ex-manufacturer prices
were those charged by manufacturers to wholesalers, while retail prices
were those charged by pharmacists to patients or insurers. Appendix 2
includes further details on the calculations.
The data set lacked certain information. First, it excluded
biosimilar products, parallel-traded generic drugs, off-patent brand-
name drugs, and generics sold in hospital pharmacies. Second,
retail data were unavailable for the Netherlands and the United King-
dom. Finally, the sales data did not reflect confidential rebates and
discounts.
Price Indexes
We calculated Laspeyres indexes to compare drug prices in 3 steps.23-29
First, for each active ingredient, we calculated the average price per
dose by dividing the total sales across form-strength combinations by
the number of doses sold. For instance, omeprazole (Prilosec) was sold
in France as 10-mg and 20-mg capsules. The ex-manufacturer sales
of these drugs amounted to roughly €88.5 million and 450 million
doses. Accordingly, the average price per dose of omeprazole was €0.197
(88.5/450). We calculated the ex-manufacturer and retail prices of each
active ingredient.
Second, we identified a subset of 80 active ingredients prescribed
in all 13 countries. This common sample accounted for between 46%
and 72% of total generic drug sales in every country but the United
Kingdom (25%). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the generic
drug markets.
Third, we calculated Laspeyres indexes using weights from a base
country, in this case Germany, since it is the largest drug market in
Europe by revenue. The rationale behind weighted indexes is that prices
of highly consumed active ingredients should be given greater consid-
eration. The indexes are calculated as:
IL =
∑n
i=1 p
c
i q
b
i∑n
i=1 p
b
i q
b
i
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where p is the price of an ingredient (i) in a comparator country (c) or
the base country (b), and q is the corresponding quantity in doses. The
base country is assigned a value of 100.
The Laspeyres results are interpreted as price ratios. For instance, an
index value of 140 for country X means that prices are, on average, 40%
higher there than in the base country (Germany). Conversely, a value
of 60 for country X indicates that prices are, on average, 40% lower in
country X. Because we limited our analysis to medicines available in all
13 countries, the indexes show how prices differ between each country.
In other words, if values of 140 and 80 are observed for countries X and
Y, respectively, it indicates that prices are, on average, 75% higher in
country X than in country Y (140/80).
Policy Analysis
To place the price-index results in context, we first summarized evidence
from recent studies on the prices and use of generic drugs in Europe and
the United States. We then surveyed peer-reviewed studies, gray litera-
ture, and books published since 2000 to (1) describe current generic drug
policies in Europe and the United States; (2) identify potential solutions
to increase generic drug use and to spur competition among generic
manufacturers; and (3) explore barriers to the introduction of generic
drug policies, using the history of substitution laws and bioequivalence
regulation in the United States as a case study.
Results
Generic Drug Market Shares and Prices
in Europe and the United States
Table 1 shows the proportion of prescriptions filled with generics in 13
European countries. The percentages were low (ie, less than 40%) in
Switzerland (17%), Italy (19%), Greece (20%), France (30%), Belgium
(32%), and Portugal (39%). They were moderate (ie, 40% to 60%) in
Sweden (44%), Spain (47%), Denmark (54%), and Poland (57%); and
high (ie, greater than 60%) in the Netherlands (70%), Germany (80%),
and the United Kingdom (83%).
Price Indexes. Figure 1 compares ex-manufacturer prices in each
country. The figure shows wide variation in prices. For example, Swiss
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ex-manufacturer prices were, on average, more than 2.5 times German
ones and more than 6 times British ones.
Figure 2 compares retail prices in 11 European countries. The spread
between the Swiss and German retail prices was smaller than the dif-
ference between the ex-manufacturer prices. Retail prices in Portugal,
Spain, and Belgium were lower than in Germany, whereas the opposite
was true at the ex-manufacturer level. Retail prices include distribution
costs (ie, transport, processing, and storage) and markups charged by
wholesalers and pharmacies.
Table 2 shows the ex-manufacturer prices of 7 of the most consumed
products in the sample. Atorvastatin (Lipitor) and simvastatin (Zocor)
are cholesterol-reducing drugs; amlodipine (Norvasc) is a calcium chan-
nel blocker used to treat high blood pressure and coronary heart disease;
metformin (Glucophage) is a type 2 diabetes medication; and esomepra-
zole (Nexium), omeprazole (Prilosec), and pantoprazole (Protonix) are
proton-pump inhibitors used to treat heartburn and related conditions.
Prices of all 7 products differ among countries. For instance, the price
per dose of omeprazole was 30 times greater in Switzerland than in the
United Kingdom (€0.811 vs €0.027). Even after excluding Greece and
Switzerland, the 2 countries that generally had the highest prices, there
were large price discrepancies.
Small price differences can have a large budget impact for high-
volume drugs. For example, roughly 294 million doses of simvastatin
were consumed in France in 2013. For simvastatin alone, if France had
paid the UK price per dose (€0.020 instead of €0.192), spending would
have been more than €50 million less. There are caveats: volumes might
not remain constant if prices change, and there might be differences in
production and supply-chain costs that prevent price equalization across
countries.
Recent Evidence. Recent studies indicate there are opportunities for
cost savings in off-patent drug markets in Europe and the United States.
A high-profile inquiry by the European Commission into generic
competition found that patients in EU countries have to wait an average
of about 7 months for generics to become available, starting from when
brand-name drugs lose market exclusivity.33 The inquiry report, pub-
lished in 2009, estimated that these delays cost payers in EU countries
€3 billion ($3.4 billion) per year, based on retail prices.33 Those find-
ings were echoed by a 2014 study, which found significant delays in the
availability of generics in many European countries.34
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The European Commission’s report showed that generics are slow
to penetrate markets: after 2 years on the market, generics account for
less than half of sales in EU member states.33 The report also found that
prices are slow to drop in many countries. Variation in prices and market
shares between European countries has been attributed to differences in
pricing and reimbursement regulations, prescribing policies, and generic
substitution laws, among other factors.27,33,35
By comparison, the United States has historically had high rates of
generic drug use—84% of prescriptions were filled with generics in
201332—and low prices.2 In recent years, however, it has seen a decrease
in competition in the generics sector. Between 2012 and 2013, the total
cost of 280 widely used generic medicines only fell by 4% in the United
States, a slower rate of decline than in the previous 7 years.36 This trend
was due to a combination of issues, including supply-chain disruptions,
loopholes in regulations by the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), tough market conditions driving firms out of business, a flurry
of mergers and acquisitions, and backlogs in the processing of generic
drug applications by the FDA.37-39
In extreme cases, reduced competition has enabled individual com-
panies to drastically raise the prices of generic drugs.40 For example, the
price of pyrimethamine (Daraprim), an off-patent anti-infective medica-
tion, went up by about 5,500% overnight in 2015.41,42 Such price hikes
have affected numerous generic drugs, including the widely used antibi-
otic doxycycline (Doryx) and the cholesterol-lowering drug pravastatin
(Pravachol). The cost of 500 doxycycline capsules rose from $20 in Oc-
tober 2013 to $1,928 in April 2014, while the cost of a 1-year supply
of pravastatin rose from $27 to $196 during the same period, according
to an analysis by the senior citizen group AARP.43 The US Govern-
ment Accountability Office reported that between 2010 and 2015 there
were “extraordinary price increases” of 100% or more for 315 out of the
1,441 generics they studied.44 Many of the affected medicines have been
around for decades at low cost.2,39,44 (There have also been documented
cases of large price hikes for generic drugs in some European countries,
like the United Kingdom.45)
Moreover, recent studies show that many American and European
physicians, pharmacists, and patients do not perceive brand-name and
generic drugs to be bioequivalent.46-56 A 2016 study found that 30%
of surveyed physicians in the United States preferred prescribing brand-
name drugs over their generic counterparts, while 27% believed generics
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cause more adverse effects than brand-name drugs.50 A 2013 US study
reported that 2 in 5 physicians “sometimes” or “often” prescribe brand-
name drugs instead of equivalent generics when patients request the
former.57
In summary, there are shortcomings in generic drugmarkets in Europe
and the United States, notably delays in the availability of generics, high
prices, and low utilization rates. These issues affect countries to varying
degrees. In the next section, we outline contemporary generic drug
policies in Europe and the United States to identify lessons that might
be drawn from different approaches.
Generic Drug Policies in Europe and the
United States
There are vast differences between countries in terms of regulatory struc-
tures, lobbying powers of special-interest groups, patent-litigation sys-
tems, political economies of health care systems, and perceptions of
generics among patients and health care professionals.58 Such differ-
ences influence the adoption and effectiveness of policies.
Figure 3 shows the patchwork of policies in place in Europe. Generic
drug substitution is mandatory in 13 countries, voluntary in 14, and for-
bidden in 5. The situation with respect to generic prescribing is similarly
diverse. Internal reference pricing, which limits how much insurers will
reimburse for generics, is used in most countries.59-61 In several coun-
tries, health insurers buy generic drugs in bulk from the manufacturers
that offer the best prices, a policy referred to as tendering.62,63 For exam-
ple, a health insurer might put out a tender for 1 million packs of 20-mg
simvastatin and ask generic manufacturers to submit confidential bids.
The winning manufacturer is asked to supply the entire market for the
duration of the contract, which typically ranges from 1 to 2 years.63
Figure 3 gives a broad overview of policies, but the way these policies
are implemented varies considerably. Other supportive measures are
often used to influence generic drug usage, such as charging higher co-
payments on branded drugs that have generic equivalents to encourage
patients to choose the latter.
National governments in all but 3 EU member states (Denmark,
Germany, and the United Kingdom) impose price controls on generics
(ie, maximum allowable prices).65 Often these controls are linked to the
566 O.J. Wouters, P.G. Kanavos, and M. McKee
Figure 3. Internal Reference Pricing (A), Generic Prescribing (B),
Generic Substitution (C), and Tendering (D) in EU and EFTA Coun-
tries (2016)a,b
IRP
Non-EU country
No IRP
A B
C D
Mandatory
Voluntary
Non-EU country
Forbidden
Mandatory
Voluntary
Non-EU country
Forbidden
Yes
No
Non-EU country
Tender-like system
Abbreviations: EFTA, European Free Trade Association; EU, European Union; IRP,
internal reference pricing.
aThese maps show the policies used by the 28 EU member states and the 4 EFTA
signatories (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) for nonhospital pharma-
cies. We populated the maps based on a 2016 report published by the World Health
Organization.64 If information was missing, we used older sources dating as far back
as 2009. The policies in some countries may have changed since then. In Spain,
only the autonomous community of Andalusia issues tenders. Generic prescribing
refers to the prescribing of drugs by their international nonproprietary names. The
Danish and Swedish tendering systems operate differently than the others. In each
country, the relevant national government agency asks generic manufacturers to offer
their best prices. Usually, the least expensive generics become the only ones that
pharmacists can dispense; if a patient wants a brand-name drug, they are required to
pay the difference out-of-pocket. The bidding process is repeated every 2 weeks in
Denmark, and every 4 weeks in Sweden. There are safeguards to reduce the risk of
supply disruptions.
bDerived from authors’ analysis of the data62-68; the map toolkit is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
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prices of brand-name drugs. In Spain, for instance, the first company
to sell a generic version of a drug must price its product at least 40%
below the price of the brand-name drug at the time of loss of market
exclusivity; subsequent generic entrants must be priced at or below
this level. Many EU governments also retain the right to block large
price increases for prescription drugs, including generics, if necessary
to protect public health or reduce pressure on the public purse.64 As
nearly all EU countries have universal health care systems, funded either
through government tax revenues or taxes on employers and employees,
a population-based focus has strong political support from consumers
and nonindustry stakeholders in these nations.69
In the United States, by comparison, generic prescribing is voluntary
in all 50 states. Neither internal reference pricing nor tendering is
used for generic drugs sold in nonhospital pharmacies. There are no
government price controls on generics, and substitution laws differ from
state to state, as shown in Figure 4.70
Pricing, prescribing, and substitution policies can affect the prices
and usage of generics.33 To illustrate this, Figure 5 shows how ex-
manufacturer prices and market shares of ramipril (Altace), a drug
widely used to treat high blood pressure, evolved between 1998 and
2010 in 4 countries. Ramipril lost patent protection in each country
in either November 2002 or March 2003, as indicated by the vertical
lines.
Figure 5 shows that it took over a year for the first generic version
of ramipril to come on the market in the United Kingdom and Spain,
compared to 2 years in Sweden and 3 years in France. The trends in
prices and market shares in each country varied considerably. In the
United Kingdom, the generic price fell to about a fifth of the branded
price within 3 months of the first generic being launched. During this
time, the price of the branded version remained unchanged and generic
ramipril captured over 90% of the British market. In Spain, on the
other hand, the generic competitor was introduced at about 60% of the
branded price and only slowly gained market share, reaching around
10% after 1 year of being on the market and only 25% after 3 years.
The branded price then fell to match the generic, which showed no sign
of responding to competition. In Sweden, at launch, the generic price
was only 10% of the branded price, which rapidly fell to a similar level.
The generic market share continued to rise steeply, to almost 100%.
In France, although the prices moved in step, the price of the generic
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drug remained about two-thirds that of the branded. Again, the generic
gained a high market share within a few years of entering the market. By
the end of 2009, generic ramipril cost 7 times more in France (€0.236
per dose) than in Sweden (€0.033).
Possible Policy Solutions
Having summarized the policies adopted in various countries, we now
outline measures that appear to be effective in promoting price compe-
tition among generic drug companies and increasing the use of generic
drugs, based on available evidence. These are generally applicable to
both European countries and the United States, wherever such policies
are not yet in place, although decisions on which ones to implement in
individual countries require detailed market analyses.
Facilitate Generic Market Entry. First, national regulators should
streamline the generic drug approval process. In response to recent
price hikes in the United States, Kesselheim and colleagues called for
regulators to prioritize applications from manufacturers trying to bring
to market a generic medicine sold by 3 or fewer firms.2,37 This would
put downward pressure on prices and make it harder for individual com-
panies to have much influence over prices. For off-patent drugs facing
limited or no competition, Kesselheim and colleagues further recom-
mended that the FDA temporarily import generics from countries with
equally high regulatory standards, like Canada and EU member states,
to avoid paying high premiums.2,71
Second, in countries with backlogs of applications for generic drug
approval, governments could allocate more resources to national regula-
tors to speed up the review process2 or could charge generic firms fees
to increase resources available for the drug approval process, as is done
by the FDA.72 In the European Union, levels of backlogs vary greatly
between national regulatory agencies, despite efforts to harmonize such
processes across the union.31 In the United States, it currently takes
about 15 months, on average, for generic drugmakers to receive an ini-
tial response from the FDA.73 Over 4,000 generic drugs were awaiting
approval from the FDA as of mid-2016.74
Third, regulators should address the anticompetitive tactics used
by brand-name firms to delay generic drug launches. Brand-name
manufacturers frequently file patent infringement lawsuits against
generic drugmakers for launching their drugs too early, preventing the
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marketing of generic products while the companies are tied up in court.33
Some such lawsuits might reflect calculations by brand-name firms that
the extra revenue obtained after patent expiry is likely to exceed the
legal fees incurred.75 Brand-name firms have employed other strategies
to hinder market entry for generic drugs, like filing patent clusters (ie,
complex webs of primary and secondary patents on pharmaceutical prod-
ucts and manufacturing processes that serve to extend periods of market
exclusivity).33,76,77 Some medicines are protected by as many as 1,300
patents,33 making it difficult for generic drugmakers to determine when
they can legally enter the market. The US Congress proposed new leg-
islation in 2015 that could make it easier for generic drug companies to
challenge patents without the need for lengthy and costly litigation.78
The bill is still under consideration. The European Commission has
called for similar measures.33
Fourth, regulators should block pay-for-delay deals, where brand-
name drugmakers offer generic manufacturers cash, or something else
of value, to delay the introduction of generic drugs onto the market.33
Brand-name drugmakers continue to enjoy monopolies, meaning con-
sumers pay higher prices for longer. These deals happen in both Europe
and the United States. In 2009, the US Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) estimated that eliminating pay-for-delay deals would save con-
sumers and the federal government over $3.5 billion a year.79 A 2013
Supreme Court ruling gave the FTC the authority to block such deals,
which it has begun to do. Yet there continue to be legal disputes over
what constitutes a pay-for-delay deal, which hamper the FTC’s efforts.
Finally, regulators should facilitate access to samples of brand-name
products for generic drugmakers. Since 2007, some brand-name manu-
facturers have taken advantage of a legal loophole in the United States to
block access to samples, citing restrictions imposed by the FDA through
risk evaluation andmitigation strategies.80,81 This prevents generic drug
companies from conducting bioequivalence tests prior to patent expiry.
These test results are needed for companies to receive marketing autho-
rization at the time of patent expiry. Several countermeasures have been
proposed by Congress and the FDA, but none have been implemented
to date.80
Encourage Price Competition. Studies on pricing policies indicate that
allowing generic drug companies to set their own prices, while giving
physicians and pharmacists incentives to prescribe and dispense the least
expensive generics, is more effective at driving down prices over time
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than government-mandated price controls.26,33,82-85 This is the approach
adopted by policymakers in Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and the United States,35 although the Swedish authorities reserve the
right to block large price increases for generics. An analysis of IMS
Health data conducted by the FDA found that drug prices in the United
States drop, on average, by around 50% with 2 generic competitors on
the market, around 70% with 5 on the market, and around 90% with
15 or more on the market.86 However, safeguards are needed to prevent
large, unjustified price hikes for drugs available in generic versions. For
example, increases exceeding a percentage threshold could be blocked
by national authorities on economic or public health grounds, with
exceptions for causes outside the control of manufacturers which are
verifiable (eg, changes in the prices of ingredients).
Tendering is another way to encourage price competition, especially
if market competition fails to achieve large price reductions for generic
medicines. As mentioned earlier, tendering refers to the purchase of
generics in bulk, usually from the suppliers offering the lowest prices.
It has been shown to lower administrative costs, drive down the prices
of generics, and improve price transparency.62,63,87,88 In the Nether-
lands, for example, the introduction of tendering resulted in the retail
prices of some generics—including amlodipine, omeprazole, and simvas-
tatin (see Table 2)—dropping by 80% to 90% overnight in nonhospital
pharmacies.87 The color, shape, and size of a pill might change after a
tender if a new manufacturer is asked to supply the market, so physi-
cians and pharmacists need to communicate such changes to patients to
promote treatment adherence.89-91 Also, European payers in charge of
tendering sometimes split contracts between 2 or more manufacturers,
as long as the bids are close to each other, to minimize the risk of supply
disruptions and to maintain competition.63 There is no conclusive evi-
dence, though, that disruptions occur more often in countries that rely
on tendering than in others.
Promote Generic Dispensing and Prescribing. Countries should require
pharmacists to substitute generic drugs for brand-name medicines.
The Swedish national government, for example, introduced mandatory
generic substitution in 2002, which led to a spike in generic drug use.92
The European Commission found that generic drugs enter the market
sooner, on average, in EUmember states with mandatory substitution.33
Currently, generic substitution is mandatory in only 11 EU countries
and 14 US states.64,70
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Governments should encourage or require physicians to prescribe
drugs by their generic names.35,93 A recent study estimated that physi-
cians blocking generic drug substitution costs the United States over
$7.5 billion per year, including $1.2 billion in out-of-pocket fees for
patients.94 This practice is also costly in European countries, including
France95 and Switzerland.96 There may be legitimate reasons for pre-
scribing brand-name drugs instead of generic ones—for example, a pa-
tient might be allergic to an inactive ingredient in a generic medicine.89
However, in many cases, those decisions are likely due to habit or mis-
conceptions about generic medicines among physicians.70 Academic
detailing (ie, having trained experts with no conflicts of interest provide
unbiased information to clinicians about the effectiveness, safety, and
costs of drugs) could help correct suboptimal prescribing.97 A meta-
analysis conducted for Cochrane found, based on data from 25 random-
ized controlled trials, that academic detailing improves compliance with
desired prescribing practices.97 Financial incentives aimed at improving
rates of generic prescribing were also shown to be effective, although the
evidence base is limited.98,99
Moreover, regulators in some countries allow pharmacists to substi-
tute a generic for a brand name drug with a different active ingredient,
as long as both drugs belong to the same therapeutic class and have
the same indication. For example, if a doctor prescribes a patient rosu-
vastatin, a cholesterol-lowering drug not yet available in generic form
in some countries, a pharmacist could give the patient generic simvas-
tatin instead.100 A recent study estimated that the United States spends
an extra $73.0 billion per year—about 10% of total drug spending—
on brand-name drugs with available therapeutic substitutes. This esti-
mate included $24.6 billion in out-of-pocket expenses.101 Most of the
estimated excess spending was on brand-name drugs in 5 classes: statins,
a class of cholesterol-reducing drugs ($10.9 billion); atypical antipsy-
chotics, a class of drugs used to treat psychiatric conditions ($9.99
billion); proton pump inhibitors, a class of drugs used to treat heart-
burn and related conditions ($6.12 billion); selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors, a class of drugs used to treat depression ($6.08 billion); and
angiotensin receptor blockers, a class of drugs used to lower blood pres-
sure ($5.53 billion).101
Therapeutic substitutes can vary in terms of side effects and other
properties, so this form of substitution is less straightforward to im-
plement than substitution of bioequivalent products. For therapeutic
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substitution to be more widely practiced, the relevant authori-
ties and clinical organizations should develop appropriate protocols
and strengthen coordination between physicians, pharmacists, and
insurers.101-103 A challenge is to get buy-in from trade groups for physi-
cians, many of which have, in the past, opposed such restrictions on
prescribing and have raised concerns about the potential adverse health
consequences for patients.101,104 In the United States, some patient or-
ganizations have also been skeptical of therapeutic substitution, worried
that legislators are too focused on cutting costs at the expense of quality of
care.103
Barriers to Reforming Generic Drug Policies: A
Case Study From the United States
Having reviewed a range of policy options, we now draw on the experi-
ence of one country, the United States, to explore barriers to reform and
offer thoughts on how they might be overcome. While we focus on the
history of substitution and bioequivalence policies in the United States
as a case study, similar analyses could be done for any country.
The history of generic drug substitution in the United States (Box 1)
shows how trade groups for brand-name drugmakers and clinicians have
consistently banded together to resist generic drug policy reform in the
United States.105-107 It is a history marked by political conflicts, vested
economic interests, and intense lobbying by stakeholders.103 Figure 6
highlights key events and milestones.
Box 1. History of Drug Substitution in the United Statesa
Generic Drug Substitution
The first instances of generic drug substitution were reported in the
late 1940s. In response, the National Pharmaceutical Council (NPC),
a trade organization for the brand-name drug industry, began aggres-
sively lobbying against substitution, saying it would stifle innovation.
The group further claimed that substitution would reduce quality of
care, citing the scientific uncertainty that existed at the time over
whether generic drugs were as effective as brand-name drugs.108
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TheNPC forged an alliancewith theAmericanMedical Association
(AMA) and the American Pharmacists Association (APhA), 2 major
trade groups for clinicians and pharmacists. The AMA argued that
substitution diminished the role of physicians, while the APhA said
it was a violation of the ethical and professional standards of the
trade. (In an apparent quid pro quo, the NPC helped pharmacists
lobby against supermarkets, whichwere beginning to sell prescription
and over-the-counter drugs.) The AMA was further concerned that
government intervention on dispensing was a step toward socialized
medicine, which they opposed.
The anti-substitution campaign was largely successful: by 1959,
44 states had enacted laws blocking generic drug substitution.
During the 1960s and ’70s, when state health care budgets were
ballooning, state and municipal governments started looking at ways
to cut health care spending. Meanwhile, there was growing support
for substitution among pharmacists, who sought a more active role
in the care of patients. In 1972, Kentucky became the first state to
abolish its anti-substitution law. By 1984, all 50 states had legalized
generic drug substitution.
However, state policies differed in 3 ways. First, generic substitu-
tion was compulsory in some states and voluntary in others. Second,
patients in many states could refuse substitution. Finally, some states
restricted which drugs pharmacists could substitute.
The rollback of anti-substitution laws on a state level resulted in a
patchwork of policies, most of which remain in place today. Physicians
in all states can block substitution, usually by ticking a box on the
prescription pad that reads “dispense as written.”70 The poorer states
have some of the weakest substitution laws in the country, leading
one commentator to recently note that “the cost savings of generic
substitution [in the United States] now appear to benefit populations
in inverse proportion to economic need.”103
To date, all attempts by federal legislators to enforce a minimum
standard of substitution have been voted down, and the politics and
economics of substitution have continued to play out at the state
level.109 Still, substitution laws have helped dramatically increase
the rate of generic drug use in the United States: around 10% of
prescriptions were filled generically in 1958, compared to 88%
in 2015.
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Therapeutic Drug Substitution
In the 1980s, state lawmakers and hospital administrators turned
their attention to therapeutic substitution. Proponents argued that
many new drugs offered little or no additional therapeutic bene-
fit over existing ones and that they should be substituted for older,
cheaper medicines—preferably generics. This would generate savings
and incentivize drug companies to develop innovative products. Trade
groups for brand-name drugmakers and clinicians opposed therapeu-
tic substitution, claiming it would harm patients.
Oregon passed the first therapeutic substitution law in 1981, and
hospitals around the country began implementing a 2-tiered ap-
proach: automatic therapeutic substitution in clear-cut cases (eg,
cephalosporins, anti-allergy drugs, and heartburn treatments) and
prior authorization in less straightforward cases (eg, beta-blockers
and anti-cancer drugs). Between 1987 and 1993, the proportion of
health maintenance organizations that allowed therapeutic substitu-
tion in nonhospital pharmacies doubled to 70%.
Private and public insurers increasingly turned to pharmacy ben-
efit managers (PBMs), who serve as intermediaries between drug
companies and payers, to help coordinate therapeutic substitution.
PBMs negotiate lower drug prices and rebates on behalf of large
patient populations. Most PBMs operate formularies specifying the
preferred products for different therapeutic indications. These organi-
zations help dictate the nature and extent of generic and therapeutic
substitution. They often rely on tiered copayment systems, whereby
patients are required to pay more for brand-name drugs.
The lack of transparency with PBMs, however, meant that insurers
were unsure about how much of the negotiated discounts was passed
on to them, and how much was kept by PBMs. Some PBMs were
bought by pharmaceutical companies, introducing further conflicts
of interest.
In 2000, partly in response to the rapid growth and opaqueness
of PBMs, the Oregon state legislature implemented guidelines on
which medicines should be prescribed to Medicaid patients for spe-
cific conditions, known as a preferred drug list.110,111 The preferred
drug list was the “public, transparent, evidence-based analogue of
the private formulary-shaping activities of the PBMs.”103 Idaho and
Washington quickly followed suit and developed their own lists.
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These 3 states joined forces with the Pacific Northwest Evidence-
based Practice Center in 2003 to form the Drug Effectiveness Re-
view Project (DERP), a collaboration between Medicaid and public
pharmacy programs in member states to promote evidence-based pre-
scribing. By 2008, the DERP consortium comprised 15 states and 2
nonprofit organizations, and 33 states operated preferred drug lists,
most of which promoted therapeutic substitution wherever possible.
The economic downturn of 2008 put the project under financial
strain. In 2014, there were only 9 paying members in the consor-
tium. Still, DERP paved the way for future research into comparative
effectiveness, a field fraught with ethical, political, methodological,
organizational, and procedural issues.
aDerived from authors’ analysis of data103,105,112; other references are
shown in the text.
Regulation of bioequivalence has played a key role in the evolution
of substitution policies in the United States.19,103,108 In the 1950s and
’60s, whenUS lawmakers started calling for generic prescribing and sub-
stitution, there was little clarity about how to verify that generic drugs
would produce the same therapeutic effects as their brand-name counter-
parts. A scandal erupted in 1967 when it was found that some patients
who consumed generic versions of chloramphenicol (Chloromycetin), a
widely used antibiotic, had no traces of the active ingredient in their
bloodstreams. It was later shown that the coating used by some generic
manufacturers prevented the drug from dissolving in the gastrointestinal
tract.101
In response, between 1967 and 1975, the US FDA commissioned
5 separate external committees to provide input on how to assess
the therapeutic equivalence of generic and brand-name drugs.103 The
proliferation of committees and recommendations slowed down themar-
ket entry of generic drugs, hurt the public perception of generics, ham-
pered the campaign to roll back anti-substitution laws, and delayed other
changes to generic drug policies during this period.103,105,113 The sci-
entific and regulatory uncertainty around bioequivalence created space
for brand-name manufacturers and their trade groups to nurture brand
loyalty and to claim, often without evidence, that there were mean-
ingful differences between branded and generic medicines.103,113 Not
until 1984 did the FDA settle on a coherent and widely accepted set of
bioequivalence standards—based on the rate and extent of absorption of
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the active ingredient into the bloodstream17—as part of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, more commonly known
as the Hatch-Waxman Act.108
The issues raised by the proponents and critics of generic drug pol-
icy reform have remained similar over the past 50 years in the United
States.105,114 The evolution of substitution and bioequivalence regula-
tion provides insights into the economic, political, cultural, and scien-
tific issues influencing policy changes. Such insights can help policy-
makers avoid past pitfalls.
Current Opportunities for Reform. Recent developments point to an
opportunity for reform of generic drug policies in the United States.
In the past few years, a series of price scandals shifted public attention
from the high prices of new medicines to the rising costs of generics,
raising pressure on companies and policymakers to contain costs.115
A 2015 national survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that
roughly 3 in 4 Americans believe prescription drug prices are unreason-
ably high, and, of those, 76% say pharmaceutical companies are mostly
to blame.116 These findings may partly reflect the reputational damage
to generic drugmakers caused by recent scandals, as well as the increase
in the number of patients facing higher deductibles for medicines.117
A subsequent Kaiser poll, in 2016, found that the vast majority of
Americans are in favor of government action to curb prescription drug
prices.118 According to the results, more than 8 in 10 Americans (82%)
favor allowing Medicare to negotiate prices with companies, while 66%
support the creation of an independent group to oversee the pricing of
prescription drugs and 71% believe patients should be allowed to buy
medicines imported from Canada.118
The increasing roles of federal and state governments in health
care has further renewed attention on cost containment.103,112,119 A
growing number of government officials, including Senators Bernie
Sanders (D-VT), Susan Collins (R-ME), Elijah Cummings (D-MD), and
ClaireMcCaskill (D-MO), are looking at ways to improve competition in
the off-patent drug market to reduce spending, with some arguing that
state and federal governments should be allowed to block unjustified
price increases on generics.120,121 Competition authorities are also in-
vestigating potential price collusion between generic companies.121-123
Private health insurers, which have a strong interest in keeping generic
prices low, have joined the debate, arguing on the side of lawmakers on
this issue. They were largely absent from discussions in the 1970s, ’80s,
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and ’90s when the prices of drugs were rising more slowly than those of
other health care goods and services.103
The outcome of the 2016 presidential election could provide further
momentum for improving generic drug policies. During the campaign,
now-President Donald Trump supported giving Medicare greater power
to negotiate drug prices and allowing states to import less expensive
drugs from Canada and elsewhere. He launched an attack on the phar-
maceutical industry at a press conference a few days prior to his inaugu-
ration. “Pharma has a lot of lobbies, a lot of lobbyists, and a lot of power,”
Trump said at the press conference. “And there’s very little bidding on
drugs. We’re the largest buyer of drugs in the world, and yet we don’t
bid properly. And we’re going to start bidding and we’re going to save
billions of dollars.” Since taking office, Trump has reiterated his support
for Medicare drug price negotiations. He has also stated his desire to
streamline the FDAdrug approval process, but without offering specifics
on how he would like to see the process for generic drugs changed.
ScottGottlieb, Trump’s new FDA commissioner who has close links to
the pharmaceutical industry and a conservative think tank, also criticized
the costs and delays of generic drug approvals. In his first remarks to
FDA staff, Gottlieb urged the agency to take “meaningful steps to get
more low-cost alternatives to the market, to increase competition, and
to give consumers more options.” He went on to say that the FDA
should “make sure the generic drug process isn’t being inappropriately
gamed to delay competition and disadvantage consumers.”124 There
are concerns, however, that changes to FDA procedures may harm the
organization’s ability to guarantee the efficacy, quality, and safety of
approved drugs, including generics.125 While it remains to be seen how
these developments play out in practice, the available evidence suggests
a willingness by the Trump administration to address price hikes and to
ensure the availability of low-cost generics. It is critical, though, that
any changes to FDA procedures do not undermine the agency’s ability
to ensure that approved generics, and new medicines, meet adequate
regulatory standards.
Yet, at this writing, American health policy is extremely
uncertain,126-130 and there are reasons why changes to generic drug
policies may prove elusive.
In January 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress approved a
budget resolution that sets the stage for a major overhaul of the health
care system, an action supported by Trump’s health secretary.129 In May
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of this year, Republican lawmakers in the House of Representatives
passed a bill to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act. Among other
things, the bill would eliminate tax penalties for Americans who do
not have health insurance, remove a mandate for larger companies to
offer affordable insurance to employees, increase annual limits on how
much individuals and families can contribute to health savings accounts,
cut taxes on high-income individuals and other groups imposed by the
Affordable Care Act, repeal income-based tax credits and subsidies for
out-of-pocket costs, remove caps on howmuch health insurers can charge
older customers in monthly premiums, and cut federal funding for Med-
icaid, a publicly funded insurance program for low-income individuals
and families.131
An analysis conducted by the nonpartisan US Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimated that the House bill would save the federal
government over $100 billion in a decade, but would also drastically
increase the number of uninsured over the next 10 years and lead to
hikes in health care premiums in the coming 3 years.132 In many states,
health care premiums and out-of-pocket costs would soar for chronically
ill patients and decline for young and healthy individuals. It is unclear
what impact such changes would have on the generic drug market, with
the CBO report silent on this issue.
The bill moved to the Senate for a debate and vote, where Republi-
can lawmakers proposed an amended version of the legislation, which
included only modest changes. However, the Senate bill was defeated
in July of this year following opposition from lawmakers on both sides
of the aisle and key stakeholders, including the American Hospital
Association and AARP. At the time of writing, Senate Republicans
have indicated that they will postpone efforts to repeal and replace the
Affordable Care Act, although Republican lawmakers can table new
health care legislation at any point.
Moreover, the American Medical Association and the Pharmaceuti-
cal Research and Manufacturers of America, 2 of the largest and most
influential lobbying organizations in the United States, continue to op-
pose government intervention in the generic drug market (see Box 1),
such as stronger substitution laws and measures to block large price
increases.105 Although both groups supported the Affordable Care Act,
they did so only after having received assurances that there would be
no price controls on medicines and no importation of cheaper medicines
from other countries, among other conditions.105
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Discussion
Amix of factors, including aging populations, slowing economic growth,
and rising costs of new drugs andmedical technologies, have put pressure
on governments to contain health care spending. Substituting generic
medicines for more expensive brand-name versions is likely among the
most cost-effective interventions in health care systems.133-139
Addressing issues in the generic drug sector can enhance equitable
access to medicines in countries where patients face high out-of-pocket
drug costs, like Cyprus,140 Greece,141 and the United States.142 Sev-
eral studies indicate that patients who use generic medicines instead
of brand name ones are more likely to adhere to treatment,143,144
probably because of greater affordability, which can improve health
outcomes.143
Between 2008 and 2015, in the wake of the global economic
recession, several European governments implemented generic drug
policies to help control costs.64,145-147 During this period, Slovakia in-
troduced voluntary generic prescribing, which was previously forbidden.
Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Portugal, and Spain made generic prescribing
compulsory. Greece and Portugal made generic substitution compulsory.
And Finland introduced internal reference pricing.
Yet, as our results show, there remain large differences in the usage
and prices of generics in Europe and the United States. The barriers
to market entry for generic companies vary between countries, as do
pricing and reimbursement policies. Beyond such features of the mar-
ket, there are differences in whether, and to what extent, patients and
health care professionals perceive generic and branded medicines to be
bioequivalent.46,47,54 In some countries, negative perceptions of gener-
ics may have contributed to slower uptake of stronger prescribing and
substitution measures.
Governments should apply coherent supply- and demand-side policies
in generic drug markets.148 There are interesting examples from smaller
European countries, like Denmark,149 Norway,150 and Sweden,149 which
have achieved low generic drug prices. There is no one-size-fits-all so-
lution, though, and there are different ways of achieving similar results.
For instance, the United Kingdom is one of the few EU countries to
forbid generic substitution. The electronic prescribing system in the
United Kingdom, however, automatically prompts physicians to pre-
scribe generic drugs when available. The country has one of the highest
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rates of generic drug use in the world,151 although some analysts ar-
gue that substitution should still be made mandatory in the United
Kingdom since physicians can be influenced by the marketing of drug
companies.152
The appropriate steps to reduce generic drug prices and to boost
demand for such medicines will vary between countries. For example, in
nations with historically high rates of generic drug use and low generic
drug prices, but which are experiencing generic drug shortages, like the
United States, the emphasis should be on facilitating market entry for
generic drug companies. In countries with low rates of generic drug use,
like Greece and Italy, more should be done to improve the perceptions
of generics among physicians, pharmacists, and patients.
Finally, it is important to trace the cultural, political, regulatory,
and scientific issues influencing the adoption of generic drug poli-
cies. Historical analyses can help policymakers avoid past stumbling
blocks when trying to enact reform.153 For example, in a comparative
study of drug regulation in the United States and Germany, Arthur A.
Daemmrich analyzed the evolution of the medical and political settings
of each country during the 20th century, highlighting points of con-
vergence and divergence.58 Daemmrich noted that legislative changes
to prescription-drug laws in the United States often occur in response
to public scandals. In Germany, by contrast, changes tend to follow
protracted negotiations between lawmakers and stakeholders.58 Drug
regulation is highly politicized and adversarial in the United States,
but much less so in Germany, where health care is widely seen as a
right.58 Such political and cultural factors help to explain differences
in generic drug policies among countries. Moreover, pharmaceutical
policies involve balancing the interests of the health care system with
those of the pharmaceutical industry, with this balance varying among
countries.
Limitations
The price comparisons in this study have limitations. First, an assump-
tion behind the Laspeyres index is that demand for prescription generic
drugs is price inelastic (ie, change in the price of a generic does not
affect demand). Although empirical data suggest that this is unlikely
to be true,154,155 other types of weighted indexes make assumptions
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that might be less likely to hold.24-26 Laspeyres indexes are therefore
commonly used to compare drug prices.23-25,149,156
Second, the IMS Health data do not reflect confidential rebates and
discounts. The list prices (ie, official prices before discounts) may over-
estimate the actual prices paid for some products.157 Even so, list prices
are meaningful to payers since they are the starting point for discount
negotiations. It is important to strengthen price transparency in generic
drug markets, since opaque pricing makes it easier for drugmakers to
charge the highest prices markets will bear.
Third, to aggregate price data across drug forms and strengths, it
is necessary to use a common unit of volume. As Danzon and Kim
explained, “the ideal unit would be a quality-constant . . . course of
therapy for a given drug, which should be applicable to all [forms] and
strengths. Such ideal units are not observable.”24 In calculating prices
per dose, we implicitly assume that a single dose of a drug, in any form
or strength, is of equal therapeutic value to all patients. Some studies
have instead calculated prices per gram of active ingredient, but this
measure suffers from other limitations.24
Finally, we had to exclude 4.1% of the drugs in our sample due
to missing information on dosage. These were mostly aerosol, cream,
gel, injectable, and powder products. This might have influenced our
findings if there were systematic differences across countries in the prices
of those types of products. Still, the common sample accounted for a large
share of total generic sales in every country but the United Kingdom
(25%). The UK results should be interpreted with caution.
Conclusions
Greater use of generic medicines is one way to constrain growth in health
care spending at a time when this is a political imperative everywhere.
Yet, across high-income countries, generic prices and market shares vary
widely. This is despite the existence of effective policies to reduce delays
in generic availability, stimulate price competition, and increase generic
drug use. There are, however, signs of change. European payers and
policymakers are showing growing interest in tendering to lower prices,
something that seems to be effective.
An immediate priority is to convince more physicians, pharmacists,
and patients that generic drugs are bioequivalent to branded products,
although this may take time. Meanwhile, much could be achieved by
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requiring generic prescribing and substitution where such policies are
not yet in place.
Given the mixed progress so far, it is critical to understand why
previous initiatives failed. Much can be learned from policy analyses,
such as the one in this paper. These typically highlight the role played
by special-interest groups in obstructing reform.
Finally, it is important to be realistic about what can be achieved. De-
spite some widely publicized examples of profiteering, discussed earlier,
most of the growth in drug spending will continue to be driven by new
medicines. For some treatments, like certain cancer immunotherapies,
the complex manufacturing process means that the scope for off-patent
products is still limited. Yet, there are opportunities for significant
cost savings from generics in many countries and, even where there are
historically strong generic markets, like the United States, regulators,
policymakers, and payers can do more to ensure timely generic drug
availability.
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Appendix 1: Sample of Medicines
List of the 200 Most-Prescribed Off-Patent Active Ingredients in the
European Union in 2013 (Anatomical Main Group in Parentheses)a,b
Acetylcysteine (R/S/V)
Acetylsalicylic acid (A/B/N)
Aciclovir (D/J/S)
Alendronic acid (M)
Alfuzosin (G)
Allopurinol (M)
Alprazolam (N)
Alprostadil (C/G)
Amiodarone (C)
Amisulpride (N)
Amitriptyline (N)
Amlodipine (C)
Amlodipine/perindopril (C)
Amoxicillin (J)
Amoxicillin/clavulanic
acid (J)
Anastrozole (L)
Apomorphine (G/N)
Atenolol (C)
Atorvastatin (C)
Azathioprine (L)
Azithromycin (J/S)
Beclometasone (A/D/R)
Betahistine (N)
Betamethasone (A/C/D/H/R/S)
Bicalutamide (L)
Bisoprolol (C)
Bisoprolol/
hydrochlorothiazide (C)
Bromazepam (N)
Budesonide (A/D/R)
Buprenorphine (N)
Candesartan cilexetil (C)
Candesartan cilexetil/
hydrochlorothiazide (C)
Carbamazepine (N)
Carbidopa/levodopa (N)
Carvedilol (C)
Cefpodoxime proxetil (J)
Ceftriaxone (J)
Cefuroxime axetil (J/S)
Cetirizine (R)
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Ciclosporin (L/S)
Ciprofloxacin (J/S)
Citalopram (N)
Clarithromycin (J)
Clindamycin (D/G/J)
Clopidogrel (B)
Clozapine (N)
Codeine (N/R)
Codeine/paracetamol (N)
Cyproterone ethinylestradiol (G)
Desloratadine (R)
Desmopressin (H)
Desogestrel/ethinylestradiol (G)
Dexamethasone
(A/C/D/H/R/S)
Diazepam (N)
Diclofenac (D/M/S)
Dienogest/ethinylestradiol (G)
Diltiazem (C)
Docetaxel (L)
Domperidone (A)
Donepezil (N)
Doxazosin (C)
Doxycycline (A/J)
Drospirenone/
ethinylestradiol (G)
Ebastine (R)
Enalapril (C)
Enalapril/
hydrochlorothiazide (C)
Erythromycin (D/J/S)
Escitalopram (N)
Esomeprazole (A)
Estradiol (G)
Estradiol/norethisterone (G)
Ethinylestradiol/gestodene (G)
Ethinylestradiol/
levonorgestrel (G)
Felodipine (C)
Fenofibrate (C)
Fentanyl (N)
Finasteride (D/G)
Flucloxacillin (J)
Fluconazole (D/J)
Fluoxetine (N)
Fluticasone/salmeterol (R)
Fluvastatin (C)
Formoterol (R)
Furosemide (C)
Gabapentin (N)
Galantamine (N)
Gliclazide (A)
Glimepiride (A)
Hyaluronic acid (D/M/R/S)
Hydrochlorothiazide (C)
Hydrochlorothiazide/
lisinopril (C)
Hydrochlorothiazide/
losartan (C)
Hydrochlorothiazide/
ramipril (C)
Hydrochlorothiazide/
valsartan (C)
Hydrocortisone (A/C/D/H/S)
Hydromorphone (N)
Ibandronic acid (M)
Ibuprofen (C/G/M)
Indapamide (C)
Indapamide/perindopril (C)
Iodine/levothyroxine
sodium (H)
Ipratropium bromide (R)
Irbesartan (C)
Irinotecan (L)
Isosorbide mononitrate (C)
Isotretinoin (D)
Ketoprofen (M)
Lamotrigine (N)
Lansoprazole (A)
Latanoprost (S)
Leflunomide (L)
Lercanidipine (C)
Letrozole (L)
Leuprorelin (L)
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Levetiracetam (N)
Levocetirizine (R)
Levofloxacin (J/S)
Levothyroxine sodium (H)
Lidocaine (C/D/N/R/S)
Lisinopril (C)
Lorazepam (N)
Lormetazepam (N)
Losartan (C)
Memantine (N)
Mesalazine (A)
Metamizole sodium (N)
Metformin (A)
Methadone (N)
Methotrexate (L)
Methylphenidate (N)
Metoprolol (C)
Metronidazole (A/D/G/J/P)
Mirtazapine (N)
Molsidomine (C)
Montelukast (R)
Morphine (N)
Moxonidine (C)
Naloxone/tilidine (N/V)
Naproxen (G/M)
Nebivolol (C)
Nifedipine (C)
Nitroglycerin (C)
Ofloxacin (J/S)
Olanzapine (N)
Omeprazole (A)
Ondansetron (A)
Oxaliplatin (L)
Oxycodone (N)
Paclitaxel (L)
Pantoprazole (A)
Paracetamol (N)
Paracetamol/tramadol (N)
Paroxetine (N)
Penicillin (J/S)
Perindopril (C)
Phenytoin (N)
Piracetam (N)
Pramipexole (N)
Pravastatin (C)
Prednisolone (A/C/D/H/R/S)
Prednisone (A/H)
Progesterone (G)
Propranolol (C)
Quetiapine (N)
Rabeprazole (A)
Ramipril (C)
Ranitidine (A)
Repaglinide (A)
Rilmenidine (C)
Risedronic acid (M)
Risperidone (N)
Ropinirole (N)
Rosuvastatin (C)
Salbutamol (R)
Sertraline (N)
Sildenafil (G)
Simvastatin (C)
Spironolactone (C)
Sumatriptan (N)
Tamsulosin (G)
Temazepam (N)
Temozolomide (L)
Terbinafine (D)
Testosterone (G)
Timolol (C/S)
Tolterodine (G)
Topiramate (N)
Torasemide (C)
Tramadol (N)
Trazodone (N)
Trimebutine (A)
Trimetazidine (C)
Valaciclovir (J)
Valproic acid (N)
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Valsartan (C)
Venlafaxine (N)
Verapamil (C)
Warfarin (B)
Zolpidem (N)
Zopiclone (N)
aThe data included over-the-counter products, such as ibuprofen and paracetamol, if these
were prescribed by a licensed health care practitioner. The active ingredients listed in bold
were available in at least one strength-form combination in each country. These 80 ingredients
comprised the common sample analyzed in this paper.
bReproduced from IMS Health 2013 (Pricing Insights database); anatomical main groups
from the WHOCC ATC/DDD Index (2015).
Appendix 2: Description of IMS Health Data
Prices
IMS Health collects data on pack prices of medicines in European
countries from government price lists, wholesaler invoices, and other val-
idated sources. The company collects data at different levels of the distri-
bution chain, based on data availability. IMS Health regularly—usually
quarterly—audits price levels to obtain up-to-date price and volume data
for each country. The company has internal quality assurance procedures.
When data are unavailable at a level of the distribution chain, IMS
Health adopts the same approach taken by national health ministries, or
the relevant authorities, to calculate ex-manufacturer and/or retail prices.
In Spain, for example, IMS Health only collects data on retail prices, ex-
clusive of value-added taxes, and then calculates ex-manufacturer prices
based on official mark-ups regulated by the government (Table A).
In some countries, IMS Health collects data on wholesale prices (ie,
prices charged by wholesalers to pharmacies), which they use to calcu-
late ex-manufacturer and retail prices. For countries where distribution
margins are unregulated, IMS Health estimates average margins, which
can vary by product group.
Refer to IMS Health documentation for more information about data
sources in each country.
Sales
IMS Health uses price and volume data to report aggregate sales, since
a common denominator (eg, doses) is needed to compare prices across
drug forms and strengths.
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Appendix Table A. Price Buildup of Medicines in Spain (2013)a
Ex-manufacturer Price (per Pack)
Corresponding Wholesale
Mark-up
€0.00-€91.63 7.6% of the wholesale price
€91.64 + €7.54 (flat fee)
Ex-manufacturer Price (per Pack) Corresponding Retail
Mark-up
€0.00-€91.63 27.9% of the retail price
(excluding VAT)
€91.64-€200.00 €38.37 (flat fee)
€200.01-€500.00 €43.37 (flat fee)
€500.01 + €48.37 (flat fee)
VAT, value-added tax.
aReproduced from IMS Health (2013).
Appendix Table B. Example Calculations for One Quartera
Product Country
Retail Price
per Pack
# of Packs
Sold
Sales
Calculation
Total Retail
Sales
A Italy €12.67 12,750 12,750 ·
€12.67
€161,542.50
B Sweden 15.50 kr 5,000 5,000 · 15.50
kr
77,500.00 kr
C United
Kingdom
£8.23 7,934 7,934 · £8.23 £65,296.82
aReproduced from IMS Health (2013).
IMS Health calculates total sales of a product by multiplying the
pack price by the number of packs sold (Table B). IMS Health relies
on the latest price in a quarter. The company excludes value-added
taxes to ensure comparability across countries. The sales figures do not
reflect discounts, rebates, clawbacks, and other forms of confidential
price reductions.
